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Animals occupy a special place in human societies. They are utilized for food (e.g., milk 
and meat), transportation, raw materials (e.g., wool and hides), energy (e.g., manure), 
recreation, and money (e.g., bartering). Furthermore, animals such as dogs, cats, and 
horses in some societies often are viewed as “companions.” Their value in long-term 
care facilities and for the emotional well-being of AIDS patients has been documented 
(Siegel et al., ). In addition to these valuable contributions, there is growing con-
cern about diseases that humans can acquire from animals (e.g., zoonoses). Zoonoses are 
overrepresented among human diseases that are defined as emerging (Table ). Taylor 
et al. (00) documented that 6% of all human pathogens are zoonotic. And of the 
5 newly emerging pathogens in humans, 5% are listed as zoonotic (Cleaveland et 
al., 00). From 6 to 006, eleven of the twelve global emerging diseases originated 
from animals (Gerberding, 004).
However, it is also important to remember that some diseases affect animals only, often 
with economic, environmental and/or societal implications. Recent examples include 
chronic wasting disease in elk and deer, foot-and-mouth disease, toxoplasmosis in sea 
otters, and salmonella in song birds. In 4, canine distemper jumped the “species-bar-
rier” and infected African lions of the Serengeti (Roelke-Parker et al., 6), killing over 
a third of the population within 6 months. 
1Adapted from Bender JB et al. (006) Recent animal disease outbreaks and their impact on human popula-
tions. Journal of Agromedicine () 5–5.
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New diseases emerge for a number of reasons: world trade, animal translocation, ecologi-
cal disruption, climate change, pathogen adaptation, and agricultural husbandry changes 
(Smolinski et al., 003). These factors represent the dynamic relationships among the 
pathogenic agent, host, and environment (Figure ). This epidemiologic triangle includes 
the intrinsic characteristics of an individual’s susceptibility to disease, including immune 
status, general health, genetic makeup, lifestyle, age, sex, and socioeconomic status, and 
extrinsic factors, which include the host’s biological, social, and physical environment. 
Coincidentally, the triangle describing this relationship is the same as delta, the symbol 
for change; change is the one constant in the on-going tension between humans and 
microbes.
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Figure . The epidemiologic triangle.
This article will discuss some recent outbreaks of disease, lessons learned, and challenges 
for the future. We will describe:
• the strong connection between animals and humans,
• the challenge of effective risk communication where there is limited knowledge of 
the risks,
• the dwindling and fragile animal-health and public-health systems,
• the lack of oversight and regulations to prevent disease transmission,
• changes in agricultural practices that result in new or re-emerging diseases, and
• the relationship between culture and disease.
We will discuss the specific examples of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), chronic wast-
ing disease (CWD), monkeypox, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and avian 
influenza. 
The Strong Connection Between Animals and Humans
Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Some diseases may not have a direct impact on human health but, nonetheless, exert 
significant societal pressure by disrupting local economies as well as world trade. This 
is exemplified by the 00 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom, which spread to 
other countries in Europe (Figure ).
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Figure . The impact of culling sheep during the outbreak of
foot and mouth disease in France, 00.
Foot-and-mouth disease is primarily a disease of cloven-footed domestic and wild 
animals. It is endemic in Asia, Africa, and parts of South America. However, some areas 
of the world are free of FMD, including North and Central America, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and most European countries. The causal agent is considered one of the 
most highly contagious viruses, and its contagiousness has huge implications on trade 
of livestock and livestock products. The disease may spread by direct or indirect contact 
with infected animals, aerosol from infected animals or milk trucks, and fomites, as well 
as through artificial insemination. People who come into contact with infected animals 
can serve as mechanical vectors, as sufficient FMD virus survives in their upper airways 
for 4 hours to potentially serve as an ongoing source of infection to livestock (Sellers 
et al., ).
During the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 00, an estimated ,000 con-
firmed cases and an additional 6 million animals were slaughtered to achieve containment 
(DEFRA, 005a). The cost of controlling the outbreak and losses due to decreased tour-
ism were estimated at £6. billion (DEFRA, 005a). The postulated source was illegally 
imported food that eventually ended up as scraps in garbage fed to pigs (DEFRA, 005b). 
The psychological and economic impact on the British population—farmers and non-
farmers alike—was huge. Increases in suicides among farmers were reported and substantial 
economic losses were incurred from a trade embargo, travel restrictions, and reduced tourist 
income (DEFRA, 005a). This does not take into account the loss of genetic stock and 
the cost of controlling the outbreak. A psychological assessment of the impact of FMD 
noted that farmers in the impacted area had significantly higher psychological morbidity 
scores compared to farmers in non-impacted areas (Peck et al., 00).
Cryptosporidiosis
Although FMD rarely is detected in humans, human health did not go entirely unaf-
fected by the outbreak. The presence of FMD, an exotic animal disease, correlated 
with a decreased incidence of an endemic zoonotic disease, cryptosporidiosis, caused 
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by Cryptosporidium parvum. Cryptosporidiosis is the most common parasitic infection 
among people in the United Kingdom, where an estimated two-thirds of cases are due 
to C. parvum. Two separate reports described a significant drop in Cryptosporidium cases 
during the FMD outbreak. Hunter et al. (003) reported a 6% decline in cases in the 
northwest of England (Figure 3). Strachan et al. (003) reported a 34% decline in Scotland, 
with a noticeable difference between FMD-infected areas and FMD-free areas. Reasons 
for these reductions were restrictions of farm-animal movement, possibly the presence 
of fewer young animals (the major source of exposure), and fewer animal-to-human 
interactions that allow transmission.
Figure 3. Reported cases of cryptosporidiosis in northwest England, –00 
(Hunter et al., 003).
This outbreak of FMD highlights the strong and varied interrelationships between 
animals and humans. Although it is a disease primarily of animals with limited direct 
transmission to humans, it can have a significant public-health impact in terms of psycho-
logical effects, and its presence can send shockwaves through local economies. In addition, 
FMD is one of the primary agents of concern for agroterrorism, not only because of the 
economic and trade ramifications it can inflict on the livestock industry, but also because 
of the severe societal impact it may have. We must never underestimate the societal impact 
of diseases even when they directly impact the health only of animals. 
A Challenge in Effective Risk Communication
A second animal disease capturing the headlines is CWD, a disease of the nervous system 
found in Cervidae: white-tailed deer, mule deer, black-tailed deer, and elk. CWD belongs 
to the family of diseases known as transmissible spongiform encephalopathies or prion 
diseases, and is a slowly progressive, invariably fatal neurologic disease in cervids. First 
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recognized as a new disease among captive mule deer in a Colorado wildlife unit, it was 
later found to be endemic in both mule deer and elk in Colorado and Wyoming (Wil-
liams and Miller, 003). The origin of the disease is unknown, but some have speculated 
that CWD  (Williams and Miller, 003):
• is an adapted strain of the scrapie agent found in sheep,
• arose as a spontaneous evolutionary event, or
• originated from a yet unidentified prion reservoir.
CWD has been found in various areas throughout North America, both in captive and 
in free-ranging cervids (Figure 4). The perceived spread from the initial endemic areas 
is likely attributable to the movement of deer and elk in commerce, local expansions of 
farmed herds, and increased surveillance efforts (Williams and Miller, 003).
Figure 4. Chronic wasting disease in captive and free-ranging cervids
(courtesy of the Chronic Wasting Disease Alliance,
http://www.cwd-info.org/index.php/fuseaction/about.map).
Since cervids were found to have CWD, hunters, farmers and venison consumers 
have become concerned about the risk of zoonotic transmission, largely because of the 
connection between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Cruetzfeldt-
Jakob disease (vCJD). Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease occurs around the world at a rate of 
– per million humans. The majority of cases has occurred among British citizens and 
persons who have resided in the United Kingdom. All vCJD cases to date have lived in 
countries with BSE. 
If CWD is a zoonotic disease, what would it look like in humans? Would people living 
in endemic areas be at greater risk? To date, investigators have not seen higher numbers 
of human spongiform encephalopathies in CWD-endemic areas. However, prion diseases 
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are rare, have long incubation periods, and can be difficult to detect. Because of recent 
concerns about prion diseases, epidemiologists are investigating neurologic diseases fo-
cusing on young people with unusual clinical presentations or neuropathology. Several 
documented clusters of cases have been investigated, often in response to concern from 
family members believing that deer-meat consumption was linked to illness (Belay et al., 
004). These cluster investigations are a challenging exercise in risk communication about 
human and animal health. One investigation involved three elderly men, all of whom had 
a history of eating venison, who died of degenerative neurologic illnesses (CDC, 003a). 
However, further diagnostic work-up revealed that only one actually had evidence of a 
prion disease. Currently, it is the consensus of the World Health Organization and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that there is no scientific evidence that CWD 
causes human illness (Belay et al., 004; WHO, 005).
As with FMD, CWD has a psychological impact on humans although it does not 
directly harm human health. No definite link has been found between CWD and human 
brain disease, yet the detection of CWD in free-ranging deer in Wisconsin and Illinois 
in 00 had a substantial impact on the human psyche. Nine months after CWD was 
discovered in Wisconsin, there was an % drop in deer-license sales (Heberlein, 004). 
Also, similar to FMD, the discovery of CWD hurt local economies. Businesses that served 
Wisconsin hunters saw sharp declines in sales, as did feed dealers and local butcher shops. 
The decrease in license sales resulted in reduced revenues for the State of Wisconsin, and 
state expenditures increased $4. million to control CWD; overall, the estimated eco-
nomic impact in 00 was between $53 and $ million (Bishop, 004). This situation 
illustrates the emotional and economic impacts of infectious diseases and the challenge 
of effectively communicating evolving risk with reference to emerging animal diseases. 
Dwindling and Fragile Animal- and Public-Health 
Infrastructure
National economies are vulnerable to outbreaks of animal disease, both intentionally 
malicious and accidental. Recent terrorist attacks have exposed the vulnerability of our 
transportation, food, and medical infrastructure. Several episodes have been documented 
in which food was intentionally contaminated for terrorist purposes (Manning et al., 
005). However, in recent years, the most dramatic impact on national economies has 
not come from terrorism, but from the accidental introduction of foreign animal diseases. 
The threat is very real when we consider the volume of travelers and traffic that enter the 
United States each year, both legally and illegally. There is no feasible way for each vehicle 
and piece of luggage to be thoroughly checked for microscopic travelers. In addition, 
millions of animals and animal products are imported. They can serve as silent disease 
carriers or can harbor insects and ticks that serve as disease vectors. Clearly, we need to 
give greater attention to training of, and cooperation among, veterinarians, livestock 
producers, extension personnel, and healthcare professionals. Specifically, since some 
of these diseases can be zoonotic, veterinarians and people who work to protect human 
health need to combine forces to quickly diagnose and control their spread, especially 
in rural communities.
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The West Nile virus is another dramatic example of the animal- and public-health 
challenges of understanding an emerging disease with only limited personnel dedicated 
to understanding insect vectors and viral spread through wild-bird hosts. Originally a 
disease of Africa and Europe, it was first observed in New York in  (Lanciotti et al., 
). Initially misdiagnosed as St. Louis encephalitis, this disease, new to the Western 
hemisphere, was astutely diagnosed with the combined efforts of a veterinary patholo-
gist, a physician, and epidemiologists. The virus now has been documented in all states 
of the continental United States. Migratory birds and competent mosquito vectors were 
instrumental in the rapid westward spread. The ensuing epizootic has had a dramatic 
 effect on horse, bird, and human populations. In 00, over 5,000 horses were reported 
ill, and 30% died as a result of the infection (CDC, 00a). The impact on raptors and 
corvids (blue jays and American crows) has also been well documented (Wunschmann 
et al., 004). However, the broader impact within ecosystems, especially on wildlife, is 
unknown. From  through 004, over 6,00 human cases and 666 deaths were 
reported in the United States (Hayes and Gubler, 005). This disease highlights some of 
the new challenges for human clinicians of unusual disease presentations (e.g., acute flaccid 
paralysis syndrome) and new routes of transmission (e.g., blood transfusion and organ 
transplantation). The appearance of West Nile virus required the training and funding of 
public-health officials in mosquito trapping, vector control, and close collaboration with 
academic institutions for disease surveillance and public education. 
Lack of Oversight and Regulations
Monkeypox was first documented in 58 in a colony of primates (hence the term). The 
first human cases were identified in 0 in Zaire by local health officials on the lookout 
for the re-emergence of the smallpox virus. This rare disease was documented among 
people who lived where hunting was an integral aspect of their lifestyle. The natural 
disease hosts are likely several species of squirrel.
In 003, an outbreak in the United States associated with legally imported African 
“pocket pets” led to seventy-two suspected human cases in six states (CDC, 003b). 
Eighteen persons were hospitalized, some because of the potential for human-to-human 
spread. Interestingly, a number of the cases were veterinarians and veterinary technicians 
exposed while treating ill pets, highlighting potential occupational risk. The majority of 
patients had direct or close contact with prairie dogs that were infected by close contact 
with imported animals from Ghana, shipped to a distributor in Texas. The shipment 
included six genera of African rodents, including rope squirrels (Funiscuirus sp.), tree 
squirrels (Heliosciurus sp.), Gambian giant rats (Cricetomys sp.), brushtail porcupines 
(Atherurus sp.), dormice (Graphiurus sp.), and striped mice (Hybomys sp.). There was a 
real concern of spillover of the virus from these imported animals to susceptible wildlife 
populations in the United States.
Even though this outbreak was not directly related to agriculture, it exemplifies the 
problem of both legal and illegal animal movements. The US Fish and Wildlife Service 
estimates that the global trade in endangered wildlife is $4. billion annually, second only 
to illegal drugs. Other examples of emerging diseases linked to live-animal trade, include 
4
the spread of rabies from trapping raccoons in Florida for game farms in West Virginia 
(CDC, 8), the collection of prairie dogs for pet markets that were subsequently di-
agnosed with tularemia (CDC, 00b), and the shipping of elk infected with CWD to 
Korea (Sohn et al., 00). All of these examples clearly demonstrate potential consequences 
when humans move animals from one area to another and the need for regulations and 
federal policies that control the transfer/exchange of exotic animals. Currently, there are 
regulations for rodents from Africa and poultry from Southeast Asia, but numerous animals 
still pass through US ports unregulated (DHHS, 003). Currently, no regulations control 
the interstate movement of exotic animals or wildlife within the United States. 
Changes in Agricultural Practices and Food Processing
The emergence of BSE demonstrated the role of animal-feed commodities such as meat and 
bone meal (MBM) in the spread of disease. Meat and bone meal is an important recycled 
byproduct used as an inexpensive protein source. Since the 50s, this protein source 
has increasingly been added to the diets of high-producing or rapidly growing animals, 
for example, beef and dairy cattle. While the BSE outbreak has largely been confined 
to Great Britain, the movement of affected animals and/or contaminated MBM spread 
the disease throughout Europe and beyond including sporadic cases in Japan and North 
America. As a result, “firewalls” were devised to decrease the amplification and spread of 
the disease when a clear understanding of the risks was identified.
In addition to changes in feed ingredients such as those that led to the spread of BSE, 
other agricultural and food-production factors that might appear to be innocuous can 
also provide a mechanism for disease transmission. For example some have speculated 
that the move from pasture feeding in the mid-0th century to intensive grain feeding has 
altered the gastrointestinal tracts of cattle in a way that favors the growth of Escherichia coli 
O5:H (Russell et al., 000) A second example is Listeria monocytogenes, a bacterium 
recognized as an animal pathogen more than 00 years ago, but seen as a significant cause 
of human illness only since the 80s. The emergence of L. monocytogenes as a food-
borne pathogen is due to pathogen survival at refrigeration temperatures, the increasing 
number of immunocompromised individuals in the population, the centralization and 
consolidation of food production, and changes in consumer food habits (e.g. consump-
tion of ready-to-eat foods) (Swaminathan, 00). This disease reflects the impact of 
changing food-processing techniques, with which post-contamination of cooked foods 
can be a source of infection. These factors demonstrate the complex and evolving nature 
of pathogens and the need for animal- and public-health surveillance systems to quickly 
identify and characterize new and emerging pathogens. 
Cultural Practices and Disease Emergence
In many communities, there exist cultural or societal practices that can inadvertently 
encourage disease transmission by artificially causing animals to congregate. Recently, 
Mycobaterium bovis was identified among deer in northern Michigan, and its presence 
was attributed to the congregation of the deer due to “baiting” or feeding by deerhunters 
(Miller et al., 003). As a result, Michigan passed legislation prohibiting the feeding of 
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deer in an attempt to limit the transmission of M. bovis. A similar phenomenon is oc-
curring with birds: when songbirds congregate at feeders, their increased proximity can 
lead to the spread of salmonellosis and their subsequent illness and death. 
Examples of global problems of disease transmission abound. In November 00, the 
detection of an atypical pneumonia quickly challenged the world public-health system. 
SARS caused illness in over 8,000 persons around the world with 4 documented deaths. 
The identification of this rapidly spreading disease had a dramatic impact on healthcare 
workers and patients’ willingness to utilize medical services (Emanuel, 003; Chang et 
al., 004; Maunder, 004). Half of the first sixty cases identified were healthcare workers, 
but, despite the risk, they continued to care for patients. The impact was felt globally 
with cancelled air flights and record low hotel occupancy rates; for example, in Hong 
Kong hotels, they dropped to % compared to 83% a year earlier (Emanuel, 003). The 
economic cost to Toronto, Canada, was estimated at nearly $ billion in 003 (Blendon 
et al., 004).
SARS is a corona virus that likely emerged from a wild-animal source (Lau et al. 005). 
This is supported by the detection of initial cases among restaurant workers handling 
exotic animals in Guangdong Province (Zhong et al., 003). SARS-CoV has also been 
isolated from masked palm civets and other wild animals in a live-animal market (Guan 
et al., 003; Lau et al., 005). Seroepidemiology of animal traders and handlers further 
supports this; 3% of animal traders had IgG antibody to SARS-CoV, as compared to  
to 3% from community control groups (CDC, 003c).
Researchers speculate that SARS-CoV likely originated from animals with which hu-
mans have infrequent contact, such as exotic species. The zoonotic link has been attributed 
to the phylogenetic relationship between corona viruses and those isolated from wild ani-
mals such as the palm civet and the raccoon dog. Contact likely occurred among southern 
Chinese who periodically consume wild-game meat for medicinal purposes. Zhong et al. 
(003) have suggested that viruses that are transmitted between species tend to undergo 
more rapid genetic change as they adapt to new hosts. It is likely that novel viruses such 
as Ebola, HIV, and SARS-CoV will continue to appear with increased human interaction 
with wild animals. The lucrative wild-animal markets in Southeast Asia, a smorgasbord 
of wild and domestic animals, are often unregulated (Karesh et al., 005).
Avian influenza is another example that illustrates the relationship of cultural and social 
practices and the appearance of animal disease. Southeast Asia is considered the epicenter 
of recent influenza outbreaks. This is linked to agricultural practices in a highly popu-
lated area. Rice fields often have standing water that attracts waterfowl. These waterfowl 
are natural reservoirs, potentially spreading the disease to other domestic animals (e.g. 
chickens, ducks, and pigs) raised outdoors. In 005 it was estimated that there were .3 
billion humans, 508 million pigs and 3 billion chickens in China (Osterholm, 005). 
The identification of novel avian influenza strains over the past 5 years documents the 
continual re-assortment of influenza viruses among birds, pigs and humans. Fortunately, 
sustained human-to-human transmission has not been documented (Ungchusak et al., 
005). But with aquatic wild birds as the natural reservoir, it will be nearly impossible to 
eradicate this disease. The H5N strain responsible for the  Hong Kong outbreak 
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of influenza in domestic poultry resulted in the culling of .5 million birds and the 
identification of eighteen human cases with six deaths (Bridges et al., 00). Similarly 
in the Netherlands, 8 million birds were culled with eighty-nine reported human cases 
and one death (Fouchier et al., 004). The 003–005 H5N outbreaks in Asia affected 
eleven countries, with 0 reported human cases and fifty-five deaths (CIDRAP, 005). 
Like SARS, the economic impact in Southeast Asia was substantial. The South Korean 
Ministry of Health and Welfare estimated that the cost of avian influenza to Asian coun-
tries at about $30 billion. Unlike SARS, influenza is a potentially greater problem with 
a common wildlife reservoir (e.g. aquatic birds). This is complicated by minimal public-
health and medical infrastructure and large numbers of other potential reservoirs, such as 
pigs and domestic poultry commingling with humans in village settings. Avian influenza 
demonstrates the immediate need for international cooperation and interdisciplinary 
interventions for disease detection, control, and prevention. It also illustrates the need to 
engage local farmers in the development of sustainable strategies to identify suspect cases 
and prevent the commingling of domestic and wild-bird populations. 
Summary
We face some critical needs as we combat emerging diseases. We must understand the 
global consequences of moving animals and animal products around the world and assess 
the impact of an increasing human population on the environment. This combination 
sets the stage for potential mixing of microorganisms around the globe in contact with 
susceptible populations. The influenza epidemic of 8– killed 50 to 00 million 
people worldwide, but since the 60s, many of us have had the luxury of forgetting 
about the enormous death toll brought by outbreaks of infectious diseases (Osterholm, 
005). Even today, however, we cannot disregard the possible catastrophic effects of cur-
rently emerging diseases.
To control emerging diseases requires early detection and intervention. The phenomenal 
speed in the diagnosis and identification of the SARS-CoV demonstrates how technologies 
have improved our response and mitigation efforts. These rapid diagnostic tests need to be 
incorporated in the field to shorten detection and response times. This is especially true 
for exotic animal diseases that can harm our domestic livestock. These tests could also 
be used to quickly identify exposed individuals for early treatment or isolation. Another 
important learning point from both SARS and avian influenza is that agricultural work-
ers may often be the first to acquire these new or re-emerging diseases. Therefore, it is 
imperative to have adequate healthcare for workers. With healthcare, timely information 
needs to be collected by public-health personnel to also assess the population health of 
agricultural workers.
Our public-health and veterinary infrastructure needs to be improved. We must build 
the expertise, resources, and tools necessary for developing the capacity to respond to 
threats posed by vector-borne and zoonotic diseases (Smolinski et al., 003). Our uni-
versities need to train more medical entomologists, vector ecologists, mammologists and 
ornithologists who have a thorough understanding of the interactions among human, 
animal, and ecosystem health. There is a need to develop interdisciplinary infectious-
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disease centers for training, research, diagnostic systems and data sharing. Furthermore, 
public-health authorities should look beyond traditional disciplines and training when 
hiring new epidemiologists and microbiologists. These and other recommendations have 
been clearly outlined (Smolinski et al., 003; NRC, 005).
In the th century, Rudolf Virchow stated that animal and human health are in-
extricably intertwined. Our common environment is where this weaving of lives takes 
place, hence, we must guard the health of our ecosystems. Recent examples include 
decreasing wetlands and the subsequent congregation of waterfowl in smaller areas, 
resulting in outbreaks such as avian influenza and Newcastle disease. Deforestation and 
the greater interaction of wildlife with domestic animals and humans are likely factors 
for the emergence of novel viruses such as hendra, lyssavirus, and Nipah (Parashar et al., 
000). Conversely, reforestation and suburbanization are likely contributing factors for the 
emergence of Lyme disease in the northeastern portion of the United States (LoGiudice et 
al., 003). Dramatic weather events have also been linked to disease emergence. This was 
documented with the outbreaks of Rift Valley fever among ruminants and people in East 
Africa and the Arabian peninsula (CDC 8, 000), following periods of above-normal 
precipitation and subsequent increases in mosquitoes. We can be sure that diseases will 
continue to emerge, and the complex relationship between animals, plants, and humans 
will require the interaction and cooperation of a broader range of scientists and medical 
professionals. The time to train them is now.
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